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THE NEW AMY, VICKY, AND ANDY ACT: 
A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS FULL RESTITUTION FOR 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS 
 
Paul G. Cassell* and James R. Marsh** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Providing restitution to victims of child pornography crimes has proven to be 
a challenge for courts across the country. Child pornography is often widely 
disseminated to countless thousands of criminals who have a prurient interest in 
such materials. While the victims of child pornography crimes often have signifi-
cant financial losses from the crimes (such as the need for long term psychological 
counseling), allocating a victim’s losses to any particular criminal defendant is 
problematic. 
Five years ago, the Supreme Court gave its answer on how to resolve this is-
sue with its ruling in Paroline v. United States.1 Interpreting a restitution statute 
enacted by Congress, the Court concluded that in a child pornography prosecution, 
a restitution award from a particular defendant is only appropriate to the extent that 
it reflects “the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the 
victim’s general losses.”2 
In the ensuing years, lower courts have struggled to implement this holding. 
Just recently, Congress stepped in to ensure that victims will receive appropriate 
restitution. In November 2018, the Senate and House resolved their differences in 
how to handle the issue, passing the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography 
Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (or “AVAA” for short). President Trump signed the 
legislation into law on December 7, 2018. 
In this article, we describe the impact of this important new legislation. We 
set the stage by describing the need for restitution for child pornography victims, 
using the story of the lead victim in the Act (“Amy”) as an illustration of why 
restitution is needed. We then turn to the problematic legal regime that was created 
by the Supreme Court’s Paroline decision, noting some of the confusion in the 
lower courts following the ruling. Against this backdrop, we then discuss the 
AVAA, explaining how it will be a useful step forward for victims of these crimes. 
 
*  Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law and University Distin-
guished Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. 
**  Founder, Marsh Law Firm PLLC. The authors thank Patricia Cassell, Jennifer 
Freeman, Thomas Jipping, Robert Y. Lewis, and Katie Shipp for helpful suggestions in 
preparing this article. 
1  572 U.S. 434 (2014). 
2  Id. at 458. 
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One even more important possibility is that the Act could set a precedent for 
expanding restitution for victims in the future. 
 
II.  AMY’S VICTIMIZATION 
 
The Paroline decision involved not only the named defendant—Randall 
Doyle Paroline—but also his victim, a young woman whom we will refer to 
pseudonymously as “Amy.”3 Her circumstances illustrate the problem of restitu-
tion in child pornography cases, and so are worth briefly recounting. 
When she was eight and nine years old, Amy was repeatedly raped by her un-
cle in order to produce child pornography.4 Amy’s uncle required her to perform 
sex acts requested by others who wanted her images for their own sexual gratifica-
tion. Amy’s abuser pleaded guilty to production of child pornography and in 1999 
was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. He was also ordered to pay the psycholog-
ical counseling costs Amy had incurred up to that time, a total of $6,325. 
By the end of her treatment in 1999, Amy was—as reflected in her therapist’s 
notes—“back to normal.” Sadly, eight years later, Amy’s condition drastically 
deteriorated when she discovered that her child sex abuse images were at the time 
one of the most widely-circulated sets of child sex abuse images in the world. 
According to her psychologist, the global trafficking of Amy’s child sex abuse 
images has caused “long lasting and life changing impact[s] on her.” As Amy 
explained in her own, personal victim impact statement, “[e]very day of my life I 
live in constant fear that someone will see my pictures and recognize me and that I 
will be humiliated all over again.”5 
 
3  The authors had the privilege of representing Amy throughout the federal court sys-
tem in her effort to obtain restitution including before the Supreme Court. Unless otherwise 
attributed, the facts in this Part are taken from Amy’s Supreme Court brief in Paroline. See 
Respondent Amy’s Br. on the Merits, Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (No. 
12-8561) [hereinafter Amy’s Merits Br.]. 
4  While the legal term “child pornography” is used throughout this article, that term 
“contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the crime—one that . . . leaves the 
impression that what is depicted in the[se] photograph[s] is [adult] ‘pornography’ rather 
than images memorializing the sexual assault of children.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The 
National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to Congress 
8 (2010) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT TO CONGRESS]. See generally PAUL G. CASSELL, JAMES 
MARSH & JEREMY CHRISTIANSEN, NOT JUST “KIDDIE PORN”: THE REAL HARMS FROM 
POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, IN REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, 
LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCE (Michigan Univ. Press 2014); PHILIP JENKINS, 
BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (2001). 
5 Amy’s suffering is similar to that documented in various studies.  See, e.g., RICHARD 
WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: CAUSES, INVESTIGA-
TION, AND PREVENTION 73-79 (2012). 
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The ongoing victimization Amy suffers from the continued distribution and 
collection of her images will last throughout her entire life. She could not complete 
college and finds it difficult to engage in full-time employment because she fears 
encountering individuals who may have seen her being raped as a child. She will 
also require weekly psychological therapy and occasionally more intensive in-
patient treatment throughout her life. 
One of the criminals who joined in the collective exploitation of Amy was 
Doyle Randall Paroline. In 2008, law enforcement agents discovered that he had 
downloaded several hundred images of young children (including toddlers) 
engaging in sexual acts with adults and animals. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to one 
count of possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of children.6 
The FBI then sent the images it discovered on Paroline’s computers to the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC’s analysis 
revealed that Amy was one of the children victimized in those images. Based on 
that information, the United States Attorney’s Office notified Amy’s counsel that 
Amy was an identified victim in Paroline’s criminal case. Amy’s counsel then 
submitted a detailed restitution request on Amy’s behalf, describing the harm she 
endures from knowing that she is powerless to stop the Internet trading of her child 
sex abuse images. In her restitution request, Amy sought full restitution of 
$3,367,854 from Paroline for lost wages and psychological counseling costs. 
Later in 2009, the district court sentenced Paroline to twenty-four months in 
prison. During a later adversarial restitution hearing, however, the district court, 
declined to award Amy any restitution.  Although the district court recognized that 
a “significant” part of Amy’s losses was “attribut[able] to the widespread dissemi-
nation and availability of her images and the possession of those images by many 
individuals such as [Paroline],”7 it nonetheless refused to award her any restitution 
because she could not prove exactly what losses proximately resulted from 
Paroline’s crime. 
Amy sought review of the district court’s denial of her restitution request, 
employing the appellate review provision found in the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
(CVRA).8 Ultimately the Fifth Circuit en banc held 10-5 that 18 U.S.C. § 2259 
does not require a child pornography victim to establish that her losses were the 
proximate result of an individual defendant’s crime in order to secure restitution.9 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that § 2259 creates a system of joint and several 
liability, which “applies well in these circumstances, where victims like Amy are 
harmed by defendants acting separately who have caused her a single harm.”10 
 
6  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2012) (made a ten-year felony by 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(b)(2) (2012)). 
7 672 F.Supp.2d at 792. 
8  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2009). 
9  In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012). 
10  Id. at 774. 
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Paroline sought review in the Supreme Court. Amy agreed that review was 
appropriate, and the Court then granted certiorari. 
 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PAROLINE DECISION 
 
In January 2014, Amy participated in oral argument through legal counsel, 
which itself was unprecedented in a criminal case, where prosecutors and defense 
attorneys are typically the only advocates allow to speak  Amy became the first 
crime victim to have argument presented directly on her own behalf to the Su-
preme Court in a criminal case.  A few months later, in April 2014, the Supreme 
Court announced its decision in Paroline.11 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion for five members of the Court, rejecting Amy’s arguments. Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented, as did Justice So-
tomayor. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion first held that § 2259 imposed a proxi-
mate cause requirement on victims attempting to recover restitution for their losses 
but that it was easily met in this scenario.12 While that issue is complicated,13 the 
key part of the opinion for the purposes of this article is the Court’s resolution of 
the issue of how to apply the statute’s causation requirements. Justice Kennedy 
thought that it was “simple enough for the victim to prove the aggregate losses, 
including the costs of psychiatric treatment and lost income, that stem from the 
ongoing traffic in her images as a whole.”14 He called these losses “general losses” 
and explained that the challenge is determining what part “of those general losses, 
if any, that are the proximate result of the offense conduct of a particular defendant 
who is one of thousands who have possessed and will in the future possess the 
victim's images but who has no other connection to the victim.”15 
Justice Kennedy then examined whether a “but for” test could be used to iden-
tify the losses suffered by a victim as the result of any particular defendant’s crime. 
He concluded that the difficulty with this approach is that a showing of but-for 
causation cannot be made since “it is not possible to prove that her losses would be 
less (and by how much) but for one possessor's individual role in the large, loosely 
connected network through which her images circulate.”16 
Justice Kennedy next turned to the causation test identified in the Restatement 
of Torts for “[m]ultiple sufficient causal sets” causing an injury – such as when 
 
11  Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014). 
12  Id. at 447. 
13 For further discussion of the issue, see generally Paul G. Cassell & James R. Marsh, 
Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims: The Supreme Court’s Paroline Decision 
and the Need for a Congressional Response, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5 (2015).  
14  Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449.  
15  Id. at 450. 
16  Id.  
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three persons lean on a car and the weight of all three is necessary to propel the car 
off of a cliff.17 The Justice explained that such tests “though salutary when applied 
in a judicious manner, also can be taken too far.”18 He concluded that applying the 
test in the child pornography context would be “taking things too far,” because 
“[it] would make an individual possessor liable for the combined consequences of 
the acts of not just 2, 5, or even 100 independently acting offenders; but instead, a 
number that may reach into the tens of thousands.”19 
For all these reasons, Justice Kennedy rejected Amy’s argument that an indi-
vidual possessor should be held responsible for all her losses. But Justice Kennedy 
also rejected the “anomalous” position that each defendant would be responsible 
for no restitution at all.20 Instead, he held that each defendant should pay some 
amount of restitution:  
 
In this special context, where it can be shown both that a defendant pos-
sessed a victim’s images and that a victim has outstanding losses caused 
by the continuing traffic in those images but where it is impossible to 
trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant by 
recourse to a more traditional causal inquiry, a court applying § 2259 
should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant's 
relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general 
losses.21  
 
Chief Justice Roberts dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The 
Chief Justice acknowledged the difficulty of deciding what share of Amy’s losses 
could be attributed to any particular defendant, concluding that “[r]egrettably, 
Congress provided no mechanism for answering that question.”22 He then exam-
ined the majority opinion and determined that it will result in tiny awards for Amy, 
meaning “that Amy will be stuck litigating for years to come.”23 He acknowledged 
that the majority opinion had cautioned against “trivial restitution orders,” but 
maintained that “it is hard to see how a court fairly assessing this defendant’s 
relative contribution could do anything else.”24 The Chief Justice concluded with a 
call for congressional action, explaining that “[t]he statute as written allows no 
recovery; we ought to say so, and give Congress a chance to fix it.25 
 
17  Id. at 452. 
18  Id.  
19  Id. at 454. 
20  Id. at 452. 
21  Id. at 458. 
22  Id. at 467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
23  Id. at 470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
24  Id. at 471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
25  Id. at 471-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Justice Sotomayor also dissented, essentially agreeing with Amy on every 
point. She began by arguing that § 2259 created an “aggregate causation” standard, 
reading the statute as “offer[ing] no safety-in-numbers exception for defendants 
who possess images of a child’s abuse in common with other offenders.”26 Justice 
Sotomayor found the majority’s interpretation fundamentally flawed because the 
statute “directs courts to enter restitution not for a ‘proportional’ or ‘relative’ 
amount, but rather the ‘full amount of the victim’s losses.’”27 Justice Sotomayor 
also concluded with a call for Congressional action, noting that “to avoid the 
uncertainty in the Court’s apportionment approach, Congress might wish to enact 
fixed minimum restitution amounts.”28 
 
IV.  THE UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAROLINE DECISION 
 
Following the Court’s holding in 2014, lower federal courts throughout the 
country struggled to implement the Paroline decision in restitution hearings in 
child pornography cases. The problem with Justice Kennedy’s opinion is that it 
failed to provide any effective guidance on the key question in all of the case: how 
much restitution should victims like Amy and others should receive. The key 
passage in the opinion was that “a court applying § 2259 should order restitution in 
an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process 
that underlies the victim’s general losses.”29 Justice Kennedy cautioned that 
“[t]hese factors need not be converted into a rigid formula, especially if doing so 
would result in trivial restitution orders.”30 
In cautioning against “trivial” restitution awards, Justice Kennedy appears to 
have been responding to a concern that Amy raised in the closing paragraphs of her 
brief. Amy warned that apportioning restitution among multiple defendants will 
result in “trivial” restitution award.31 Amy explained that her images were at that 
time identified in 3,200 American federal and state criminal cases. She noted that, 
unfortunately, cases prosecuted at the federal level represent just a fraction of the 
child pornography criminals who cause her injuries because law enforcement can 
only apprehend a small fraction of those who distribute and possess the child 
pornography depicting her. Based on rough calculations, Amy offered the ballpark 
estimate that Paroline’s “market share” of her harm is 1/71,000 and that any 
individual defendant’s restitution obligation to her would be a trifling amount: 
about $47 which was calculated by taking the full amount of her losses 
($3,367,854) and then multiplying by 1/3,200 (the total number of cases where her 
 
26  Id. at 476 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
27  Id. at 480 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
28  Id. at 488 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. at 458.  
30 Id. 
31 Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 3, at 65. 
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images had been found) and then 1/10 (the ten percent law enforcement apprehen-
sion rate) and then 45/100 (the percentage of child pornography criminals who are 
found in this country).32 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion addressed these troubling numbers. 
After recounting the computation, Chief Justice Roberts noted the majority’s 
disclaimer that trivial awards were inappropriate, but he concluded, “it is hard to 
see how a court fairly assessing this defendant’s relative contribution could do 
anything else.”33 
Because the Supreme Court offered no guidance on this essential topic, lower 
courts have had difficulty determining restitution awards for convicted child 
pornography defendants. As one summary of the caselaw concluded, “Since the 
Paroline decision, federal courts have struggled to calculate appropriate awards. 
The Paroline decision has done little to help courts clarify the amount of restitu-
tion that victims should be awarded.”34 
For example, in the immediate wake of the opinion, the District Court in the 
Northern District of New York noted that “in the handful of district courts that 
have grappled with the matter of restitution in child pornography cases post-
Paroline, several have expressed their concern with the lack of precise guidance 
from Congress and the Supreme Court in deciding restitution awards in these 
circumstances…. Having now grappled with the same issues, this Court finds that 
such concerns are well founded.”35  Similarly, the District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island found that “some of the factors the Supreme Court suggests to be 
considered are at best difficult, and at worst impossible to calculate in this case as 
in most similar cases.”36  The District Court for the District of Nevada agreed that 
“Paroline is of limited use because no logical starting point can be determined.37  
More colorfully, the District Court of the Eastern District of New York wrote that 
“though commentators may quarrel over the astuteness of the Supreme Court’s 
professed confidence in the skill of the district courts to divine a true course 
through this thicket…the task seems akin to piloting a small craft to safe harbor in 
a Nor’easter.…. The task of charting passage through these unknown waters is 
 
32 Amy’s Merits Br., supra note 3, at n.19 (calculating 3,367,854 x 1/3,200 x 1/10 x 
45/100 ≈ $47). 
33 Paroline, 572 U.S. at 471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
34 Janet Lawrence, The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court Made It More Diffi-
cult for Victims of Child Pornography, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 325, 362 (2016). 
35 United States v. Miner, No. 1:14-CR-33 MAD, 2014 WL 4816230, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2014), vacated in part, 617 F. App’x 102 (2d Cir. 2015). 
36 United States v. Crisostomi, 31 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364 (D.R.I. 2014). 
37 In United States v. Austin, No. 3:14-CR-0070-LRH-WGC, 2015 WL 5224917, at *2 
(D. Nev. 2015).  
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overwhelming.”38  Equally noteworthy, several courts explicitly joined Chief 
Justice Robert’s and Justice Sotomayor’s calls for Congressional action.39  
 
V.  INNOVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMY, VICKY, AND ANDY ACT 
 
Against the backdrop of both the difficulty that lower courts were having in 
implement the Paroline decision and the decision’s express call for Congress to 
step in, it was perhaps inevitable that Congress would pass some sort of legislation 
addressing restitution in child pornography cases.40 And in late 2018, acting by 
 
38 In United States v. DiLeo, 58 F. Supp. 3d 239, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).  Two years 
later, the same court employed a different metaphor to describe the difficult of the task, 
explaining “It should be clear by now for sure that “restitution” in child pornography cases 
is a minefield.” United States v. Darbasie, 164 F. Supp. 3d 400, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
Many other courts reached similar conclusions.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell-Zorn, 
No. CR 14-41-BLG-SPW, 2014 WL 7215214, at *3 (D. Mont. 2014) (“These tools 
provided by Paroline, while seemingly useful in a theoretical sense, have proven to have 
very difficult, and very limited, practical application.”); United States v. Ayer, No. 2:15-
CR-86-APG-NJK, 2015 WL 7259765, at *2 (D. Nev. 2015) (“While the Paroline factors 
offer some guidance, the practical application of those factors is extraordinarily difficult.”); 
United States v. Miller, No. 13-20928, 2015 WL 6689363, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“It is 
extremely difficult to quantify the loss sustained by these minor victims.”); United States v. 
Reynolds, Crim. No. 12-20843, 2014 WL 4187936, at *5-*6 (E.D. Mich. 2014), aff’d, 626 
F. App’x 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (“…it is simply not possible for the Government to show, ‘as 
a starting point,’ the amount of losses caused by the ‘continuing trafficking’ in Cindy and 
Vicky’s images.”).   
39 United States v. Schultz, No. 14-10085-RGS, 2015 WL 5972421, at *3 (D. Mass. 
2015) (Congressional action “would eliminate much of the present variability in victim 
restitution awards.”); United States v. Galan, No. 6:11-CR-60148-AA, 2014 WL 3474901, 
at *8 (D. Or. 2014), vacated and remanded, 804 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The current 
statutory process for restitution does not fully compensate losses suffered by child pornog-
raphy victims and may, in fact, dissuade victims from seeking restitution; the end result is 
hardly worth yet another reminder of their continued exploitation. The court cannot remedy 
this problem. Rather, it is up to Congress to develop a system to truly compensate child 
pornography victims for the losses they continue to suffer.”); United States v. Galan, 804 
F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We do agree that this area, in which Congress has 
adopted a scheme that at least approaches the limits of fair adjudication, despite attempts by 
the courts to avoid caprice, cries out for a congressional solution.”). 
40 See Professor Richard L. Hasen, Election Law Blog, 
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=60802 (visited Jan. 10, 2019, posted on April 23, 2014 
(“Even though Congress rarely overrides [the Supreme Court] these days, I predict an 
override in this case, and probably relatively quickly…. this seems the ideal case for a 
Congressional override.”); Dean A Mazzone, Paroline v. United States: The Question of 
Restitution, 16 ENGAGE, July 15, 2015 (“In the end, Congress will have to fix the statute it 
wrote. Well intentioned guidance by the Supreme Court is simply no substitute for the hard 
work of legislating.”). 
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way of unanimous consent, both the House and Senate approved the ‘‘Amy, 
Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018,” which the 
President then quickly signed into law. Because the Act significantly changes the 
way in which child pornography restitution claims are handled, it is useful to 
review how Congress intended the Act to operate and structured the Act’s provi-
sions. The Act makes significant changes in four areas: determining restitution 
amounts, awarding restitution based on aggregate causation, establishing a fund for 
victims to access in lieu of individualized awards, and providing victims with 
access to evidence. We describe and critique the AVAA’s changes in each of these 
four areas in turn. 
 
A.  Determining Restitution Awards 
 
The AVAA restructures the way in which courts will award restitution to vic-
tims in child pornography cases. Congress created an umbrella category of “traf-
ficking in child pornography,” which includes possession of child pornography and 
similar crimes.41 For these trafficking crimes, a sentencing court will have to make 
two separate findings when a victim requests restitution. First, “[t]he court shall 
determine the full amount of the victim’s losses that were incurred or are reasona-
bly projected to be incurred by the victim as a result of the trafficking in child 
pornography depicting the victim.”42 Second, after making this determination, the 
court “shall order restitution in an amount that reflects the defendant’s relative role 
in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses, but which is no less than 
$3,000.”43 A victim can continue to seek and be awarded restitution in various 
federal child pornography cases until receiving the full amount of her losses, but 
no more. 
This change, while modest, is important for child pornography victims like 
Amy, Vicky, and Andy, who have significant losses caused by a huge number of 
offenders. The AVAA clarifies that losses must be awarded not simply for past, 
out-of-pocket losses, but also all future losses “reasonably projected to be incurred 
by the victim.”  
In addition, Congress establishes a minimum restitution amount of $3,000 for 
trafficking in child pornography cases which can be increased depending on “the 
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses”—
the so-called Paroline factors.  By setting a guaranteed minimum restitution 
amount (or “floor”) of $3,000 for child pornography possession and distribution 
crimes, Congress has ensured that victims with significant losses (such as Amy, 
Vicky, Andy and others) will be able to begin collecting a series of $3000 awards 
which should ultimately allow victims to achieve full restitution for the losses they 
 
41 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(3). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(A).  
43 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2)(B).  
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have suffered. By setting a specific minimum amount that must be awarded, the 
Act should help reduce seemingly interminable litigation about the relative causal 
role that a particular defendant plays in causing losses along with “trivial” restitu-
tion awards. 
In light of recent simultaneous changes Congress made to federal sentencing 
laws in the First Step Act44—including the repeal of some mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws—some observers may wonder whether the two new laws are 
philosophically inconsistent. Is there a conceptual conflict between establishing 
mandatory restitution amounts while abolishing (some) mandatory sentences? Any 
perceived conflict disappears when the AVAA’s specific purposes are considered. 
Mandatory minimum prison terms can sometimes be draconian and blunt,45 as 
some of the AVAA’s key sponsors have argued.46 But the AVAA does not specify 
mandatory prison sentences designed to punish offenders. Instead, the AVAA 
provides minimum restitution amounts designed to compensate injured victims. 
And defendants will still be able to pay those amounts in an appropriate way over 
time since nothing in the AVAA alters or supersedes the general provisions in the 
restitution statute which requires judges to set a reasonable and proportional 
payment schedule.47 
A requirement to pay such a modest amount as $3,000 should not raise any 
constitutional concerns, specifically Eighth Amendment “excessive fine” con-
cerns.48 Most federal courts agree that restitution is remedial in nature and there-
fore not subject to Eighth Amendment punishment or “excessive fine” limitations, 
but a circuit split exists on this issue.49 The Paroline decision flagged the possibil-
 
44  Pub. L. 155-391. 
45 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1 (2010).  
46 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States 
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences and the Search for a Certain and 
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192–95 (1993). 
47 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A)(2).  
48 Nor is there any Sixth Amendment problem with restitution awards being made by 
judges rather than juries, although at least two Justices on the Court have recently indicated 
an interest in exploring this subject. See Hester v. U.S., --- U.S. ---, 2019 WL 113622 (Jan. 
7, 2019 Mem.) (Gorsuch & Sotomayor, J.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
49 Compare, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (holding Eighth Amendment not applicable to § 2259 because the purpose of 
restitution “is remedial, not punitive”), with United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144 
(9th Cir. 1998) (“[R]estitution under the [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”)] is 
punishment” and subject to Eighth Amendment limitations “because the MVRA has not 
only remedial, but also deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive purposes.” (citation 
omitted)).  
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ity that large restitution awards could raise constitutional concerns, while not 
deciding the issue one way or the other.50 
The better view on this question is that restitution (at least as provided in the 
AVAA) is not a punitive measure subject to the Eight Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause, but rather is a compensation regimin designed to restore crime 
victims.51 It is difficult to argue that restitution is a “fine” covered by the Clause, 
since a “fine” is a “pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the 
public treasury.”52 Conversely, a restitution award under § 2259 is payable not to 
the public treasury, but to a crime victim. And the findings that are included in the 
AVAA make clear that these awards are designed not to punish defendants, but 
rather to ensure that “victims of child pornography be compensated for the harms 
resulting from every perpetrator who contributes to their anguish.”53 As Professors 
Tsachi Keren-Paz and Richard W. Wright have concluded in a thoughtful review 
of this issue, “as long as the restitution order simply compensates the victim for her 
actual losses, without any additional extra-compensatory element added for penal 
purposes, it should not give rise to any constitutional or other issues regarding 
appropriate punishment, despite the possible deterrent and perhaps rehabilitative 
effects of the restitution order.”54 
In any event, even if the Constitution’s prohibition on excessive “fines” can 
somehow be contorted to apply to the AVAA’s restitution awards, a fine is only 
excessive if “it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”55 
Child pornography felonies are serious crimes punishable by lengthy and in some 
cases mandatory prison terms.56 Against this backdrop, modest restitution awards 
cannot be viewed as excessive. 
While the $3,000 requirement for restitution in possession cases is not in any 
way excessive, the real question concerning the amount is whether it is inadequate. 
For example, given Amy’s losses of more than $3,000,000 (outlined earlier), the 
$3,000 minimum restitution amount requires her to file for restitution in more than 
1,000 cases, requires courts and probation officers to enter awards and supervise 
collections, and requires that Amy actually receive that amount. 
 
50 See 572 U.S. at 455-56.  
51 See United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1318–23 (D. Utah 2004) (Cas-
sell, J.) (explaining why restitution is not punitive. See also Amicus Brief of Vicky and 
Andy, U.S. v. Paroline, No. 12-8561 (same).  
52 Black’s Law Dictionary 664 (8th ed. 2004); see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 
U.S. 321, 327-28 (1998). 
53 AVAA, Sec. 2(7) (findings).  
54 Tsachi Keren-Paz & Richard W. Wright, Liability for Mass Sexual Abuse, 56 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 185 (forthcoming 2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141016. 
55 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. 
56 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b). 
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Chief Judge Anne L. Aiken of the District of Oregon, who joined in asking 
for congressional action to overturn Paroline, clearly pointed out this problem of 
awarding victims such as Amy just a few thousand dollars. Quoting Chief Justice 
Roberts dissent, she explained that “’experience shows that the amount in any 
particular case will be quite small—the significant majority of defendants have 
been ordered to pay Amy $5,000 or less. This means that Amy will be stuck 
litigating for years to come.’ Such piecemeal results hardly remedy the ‘continuing 
and grievous harm’ caused by the repeated exploitation of child pornography 
victims.”57 For administrative convenience purposes alone, surely a larger amount 
would be better and more expeditious. 
Given the complexities inherent in creating a congressional structure for child 
pornography restitution awards, it is perhaps understandable the first post-Paroline 
foray by Congress is somewhat limited. Perhaps district courts will treat the $3,000 
as simply a floor and begin making substantially higher awards, as Congress has 
explicitly authorized. But regardless of what courts do, in the future, Congress 
should significantly increase the minimum award that Amy and other victims can 
receive. 
 
B.  Recognizing the Aggregate Causation Principle 
 
A sound legal basis now exists for Congress to significantly increase the min-
imum amounts established in the AVAA. In another innovation, the AVAA 
recognizes the important principle found in the “aggregate causation standard.” In 
its findings supporting the Act, Congress acknowledged that the “collective 
conduct” of all person involved in the reproduction, distribution, and possession of 
child pornography “plays a part in sustaining and aggravating the harms to that 
individual victim.” Congress expressed its intent that “victims of child pornogra-
phy be compensated for the harms resulting from every perpetrator who contrib-
utes to their anguish. Such an aggregate causation standard reflects the nature of 
child pornography and the unique ways that it actually harms victims.” 
As Amy argued before the Supreme Court, this aggregate causation standard 
is well recognized in modern tort law. Tort law, which is often relied upon when 
considering criminal restitution, has never limited liability based on an individual’s 
“causal relation” to a victim’s losses. Instead, tort law has typically considered 
whether a wrongdoer (i.e., a tortfeasor) has contributed in some way to the victim’s 
larger losses. For example, the American Law Institute has identified contributing 
cause as a general principle of tort law which is sufficiently well-established to be 
included in its restatement. As explicated by the American Law Institute’s most 
recent Restatement, “[w]hen an actor’s tortious conduct is not a factual cause of 
 
57  United States v. Galan, 6:11-cr-60148-AA, 2014 WL 3474901, at *2 (D. Or. July 
11, 2014) (quoting Paroline, 572 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)), rev’d on other 
grounds, 804 F.3de 1287 (9th Cir. 2015).  
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harm under the standard in § 26 [i.e., independently sufficient or but-for causation] 
only because one or more other causal sets exist that are also sufficient to cause the 
harm at the same time, the actor’s tortious conduct is a factual cause of the 
harm.”58 This approach recognizes for the purposes of tort law that it is often 
impossible to identify a single “cause” for an event.59 In determining tort compen-
sation, the proper question is whether the defendant’s crime was part of a “causal 
set” producing harm – as Paroline’s surely was.60 
Justice Kennedy tacitly acknowledged that these tort law principles supported 
Amy’s position, but maintained that “Congress gave no indication that it intended 
its statute to be applied in the expansive manner the victim suggests” which would 
result in holding offenders collectively responsible for “the conduct of thousands 
of geographically and temporally distant offenders acting independently, and with 
whom the defendant had no contact.”61 Of course, whatever the propriety of Justice 
Kennedy’s interpretation of the statute in 2014, his interpretation not longer applies 
in 2019 after the AVAA’s enactment. Congress has, indeed, now specifically 
indicated that it intends to impose restitution based on an “aggregate causation” 
standard, as recognized by the Restatement and encouraged in Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent. 
In doing so, Congress has corrected a mistake the Justice Kennedy made in 
recounting tort principles. Justice Kennedy recited passages about negligent 
tortfeasors, overlooking that for intentional tortfeasors “[m]ore liberal rules are 
applied as to the consequences for which the defendant will be held liable, the 
certainty of proof required, and the type of damage for which recovery is to be 
permitted….”62 Victims of intentional torts generally do not have to establish a 
standard proximate cause nexus because “[a]n inquiry into proximate cause has 
traditionally been deemed unnecessary in suits against intentional tortfeasors.”63   
In construing § 2259 as a tort-like statute, the applicable principles are 
grounded in intentional torts, not negligent acts.64 And in amending the statute, 
Congress has made it clear that child pornography crimes are like intentional 
 
58  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 cmt. f, at 381 (2010) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
59  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at § 27 cmt. f, Reporters’ Note at 391 (collect-
ing authorities discussing this point).  
60  See Amy’s Brief on the Merits at 50, Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 
(2014) (No. 12-8561) (noting Petitioner Paroline effectively conceded this point). 
61  572 U.S. at 455. 
62  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 37 (5th ed. 
1984). 
63 Ass’d Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 548 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).   
64 See Paul G. Cassell, James R. Marsh & Jeremy M. Christiansen, The Case for Full 
Restitution for Child Pornography Victims, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 101-06 (2013).  
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torts.65 Accordingly, construing § 2259 as extending liability more broadly for 
child pornography crimes than standard proximate cause principles would for non-
intentional acts, is consistent with, not a departure from, conventional tort theory.66 
Justice Kennedy’s single-minded focus on apportionment seems to stem from 
the belief that the principle of “full liability” is somehow “disproportionate” to an 
individual defendant’s crime.67 But tort law is never proportionate to culpability. A 
few seconds of inattentive driving can lead to a multi-million-dollar wrongful 
death judgment. A small tap on an eggshell plaintiff can cause a skull to collapse 
with huge liability. The overarching tort rule is that a wrongdoer takes his victim 
as he finds her.68 Justice Kennedy only cruelly deviated from that rule because any 
perceived lack of “proportionality” stems from the fact that Amy has suffered large 
losses. 
The AVAA properly restores the focus of restitution on the victim rather than 
the defendant. Through its aggregate causation standard and fixed minimum 
awards, Congress has tried to give substance to the § 2259’s promise that victims 
receive restitution for the “full amount” of their losses. 
 
C.  A Defendant-Financed Restitution Fund 
 
Another Congressional innovation found in the AVAA is a fund through 
which child pornography victims can receive a one-time fixed amount of compen-
sation. In a new subsection entitled “Defined Monetary Assistance,” Congress 
provides that victims of child pornography trafficking crimes, at their election, can 
receive $35,000 to help them recover.69 (The amount is inflation-adjusted in future 
years.) A victim may only receive this assistance once. To be eligible for such a 
payment, a district court must determine that the “claimant is a victim of the 
defendant who was convicted of trafficking in child pornography.” If a court 
makes such a determination, then the victim receives $35,000 in defined monetary 
assistance as specified in the statute. 
Payments to victims are made from the Child Pornography Victims Reserve, 
which is carved out of the much larger federal Crime Victim’s Fund.70 The 
Reserve is funded in part by special assessments imposed on convicted child 
pornography trafficking defendants. The reserve cannot exceed $10 million dollars 
 
65  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (intentional invasion 
of seclusion); id. § 652D (intentional invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at 
§ 46 (intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
66 For an interesting and extended discussion of the topic, see Tsachi Keren-Paz & 
Richard W. Wright, Liability for Mass Sexual Abuse, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 185 (forthcom-
ing 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141016. 
67  Paroline, 572 U.S. at 456. 
68  RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at § 31. 
69 AVAA, Sec. 4 (defined monetary assistance).  
70 See 34 U.S.C. § 20101(d). 
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and can be maintained at that level as a set aside within the Crime Victim’s Fund. 
The assessments imposed on defendants are graduated based on the seriousness of 
their crime of conviction.  Defendants convicted of possession crimes can be 
assessed “not more than $17,000,” of any other trafficking crime “not more than 
$35,000,” and of production crimes “not more than $50,000.” The Attorney 
General will administer the fund and is directed to issue guidelines and regulations 
to implement this section. The Attorney General is also required to a submit a 
report to Congress in two years, explaining how the new restitution law has been 
implemented and assessing the funding levels for the Child Pornography Victims 
Reserve. 
In establishing defined monetary assistance of $35,000 (inflation adjusted), 
Congress implicitly recognized that victims of child pornography face lifetime 
losses that might not be easily or otherwise be fully compensable. One way to 
address this problem is to establish or expand government funded programs such 
as Medicaid which already provide psychological counseling to victims.71 But 
rather than moving in that direction, the AVAA takes the welcome first step of 
simply giving victims a lump sum amount which they can use however they want. 
An important aspect of the Reserve is that it will be financed through special 
assessments levied against defendants convicted of child pornography crimes. 
Given the number of federal prosecutions for these crimes, this special assessment 
could theoretically generate upwards of $15,000,000 per year for the Reserve.72 
This may turn out to be wishful thinking, however, since not all defendants have 
the financial resources to actually pay the full amount of the assessment. In any 
case, the Congressional report should answer the question about whether defendant 
contributions to the Reserve will alone render it self-sustaining. The $10 million 
set aside within the Crime Victims Fund, along with defendant contributions, 
should render the Reserve capable of providing defined monetary assistance to 
every victim who applies. But this, too, remains uncertain at this point. 
Here again, while Congress’ cautiously set the defined amount victims can 
obtain from the Reserve at just $35,000, in the future, armed with additional 
information about distributions and the viability of defendant contributions, 
Congress could increase the size of the awards. For example, $35,000 is only about 
 
71 See Warren Binford et al., Beyond Paroline: Ensuring Meaningful Remedies for 
Child Pornography Victims at Home and Abroad, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 117, 133 (2015) 
(“Despite the efforts of the United States to combat child pornography through a legal 
framework focused primarily on prosecution, the United States has failed to ensure that 
child pornography victims experience full physical and psychological recovery and social 
reintegration.”) 
72 Some back-of-the-envelope calculations are possible by combing the Sentencing 
Commission’s recent report that about 1800 federal defendants are convicted of child 
pornography crimes each year. If we assume that these are all possession crimes and that 
about half will ultimately be able to pay the $17,000 special assessment, that generates 
roughly $15 million per year for the fund.  
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1% of Amy’s losses. For other similarly situated victims, there should be a 
mechanism and the resources available to award substantially more than the 
$35,000 defined amount. Once Congress evaluates how the fund operates, it 
should consider removing the hard cap of $35,000 and allow discretion to fund 
administrators to award additional dollars to victims who, like Amy, have suffered 
more sizable losses. 
More broadly, Congress should use the Reserve it established for child por-
nography victims as a model for victims of other federal crimes. While calculating 
restitution awards for child pornography victims raises some unusual and unique 
challenges, federal crime victims generally suffer similar difficulties obtaining full 
restitution for their losses.73 Many federal crime victims never recover significant 
restitution from the offender who victimized them, even if the offender is caught 
and convicted.74  
The AVAA creates a compensation fund only for child pornography victims. 
But the basic fund concept can be easily expanded to other crimes. For serious 
crimes (such as violent felonies), Congress could simply require all convicted 
defendants to pay special assessments like those required from convicted child 
pornography defendants by the AVAA. There can be little doubt that, particularly 
for violent crimes, substantial special assessments are appropriate and proportion-
ate to the losses that criminals cause their victims. The National Institute of Justice, 
for example, has derived costs of various violate crimes (in 2008 dollars) reported 
in the literature.75 The figures their derived were $8.9 million for murder, $240,000 
for sexual assault, $107,000 for assault, $42,000 for robbery, and $21,000 for 
arson. Against this backdrop, requiring every federal defendant convicted of a 
violent crime to pay a special assessment of $17,000 seems eminently reasonable. 
These assessments could then be used to provide compensation to a much broader 
group of federal crime victims.76 
 
D.  A Right to Evidence Provision 
 
 
73 See, e.g., Alanna D. Francois, Paroline v. United States: Mandatory Restitution an 
Empty Gesture, Leaving Victims of Child Pornography Holding the Bag, 42 S.U. L. REV. 
293, 336-37 (2015) (explaining how lack of restitution for child pornography victims is 
simply part of a larger problem). 
74 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL RESTITUTION: MOST DEBT IS OUTSTANDING AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD 
BE IMPROVED (2018). 
75 Kathryn E. McCollister, The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Esti-
mates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG ALCOHOL. DEPEND. 98 (2010).  
76 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-115, FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL RESTITUTION: FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR A POTENTIAL EXPANSION OF FEDERAL 
COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO ORDER RESTITUTION (2017). 
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A final crucial innovative provision in the AVAA creates a victim’s “right to 
evidence.” Congress provided that in any criminal proceeding, a victim “shall have 
reasonable access to any property or material that constitutes child pornography” 
that depicts the victim.”77 The provision allows the victim (or her attorney or an 
expert witness) to view the materials depicting that victim, provided that under “no 
circumstances may such child pornography be copied, photographed, duplicated, 
or otherwise reproduced.” 
This statute gives victims the same right to review evidence in their case that 
defendants currently possess. Defense attorneys, of course, can review the evi-
dence involved in a child pornography prosecution. Victims now have the same 
right to essential information about their crime, permitting them to vindicate their 
rights in the criminal proceeding.  
This access to evidence provision also gives victims the opportunity to pursue 
civil relief against defendants. Even though a criminal conviction generally estops 
a defendant from contesting liability in a subsequent civil case, it has sometimes 
been difficult for child pornography victims to prove that a defendant specifically 
possess pornography depicting them. The new provision should facilitate that 
proof, allowing victims to take advantage of civil causes of action, including the 
$150,000 presumed damages provision already found in Masha’s law.78 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we have reviewed some of the valuable steps forward found in 
the AVAA, as well as the work that remains to be done. But in closing, it may be 
useful to remember that the legal issues swirling around restitution decisions have 
real world consequences, both for the defendants who must pay the restitution 
awards and the victims who need and deserve compensation. As between these two 
groups, however, the equities tip decisively in favor of victims.79 To be sure, large 
restitution awards have financial consequences for criminal defendants.80  But the 
stark fact remains that criminals have a choice to commit the crime or not. Having 
voluntarily chosen to commit a crime producing serious lifelong financial reper-
cussions for victims, a defendant has no right to complain when courts require him 
to contribute to making victims whole. Victims of child pornography crimes – and, 
 
77 AVAA, Sec. 6 (Child Pornography Victim’s Right to Evidence). 
78 See James Marsh, Masha’s Law: A Federal Civil Remedy for Child Pornography 
Victims, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 459 (2011).  
79 See generally ROBYN HOLDER, JUST INTERESTS: VICTIMS, CITIZENS AND THE PO-
TENTIAL FOR JUSTICE 211-22 (2018).  Cf. TYRONE KIRCHENGAST, VICTIMOLOGY AND 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 92-93 (2017) (noting 
increasing recognition of need for restitution in many countries).   
80 See, e.g., SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE 
LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 126 (2018). 
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more broadly, all serious federal crimes – deserve to have their interests prioritized 
in federal sentencing statutes. The AVAA is a modest but useful step in that 
direction. 
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